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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF ARBITRATION
DIANE P. WOOD*

Once, long ago, arbitration was a method of dispute resolution that the
courts viewed with skepticism. Those days now are only a distant memory. In
1925, Congress laid the groundwork for change when it passed the Federal
Arbitration Act.' At first, outside the realms of organized industrial relations
and international commercial transactions, little seemed different. It was not
even clear to what extent the new federal policy on arbitration applied only to
the federal courts, and to what extent it affected state courts and state law as
well. In 1964, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,2 the
Supreme Court signaled that a new and favorable day had dawned for
arbitration. Perhaps this was because the pressure of exploding dockets was
beginning to make itself felt; perhaps legal philosophers who had long urged
the use of more harmonious methods of dispute resolution were making
headway; perhaps, as class actions were becoming popular in the wake of the
1966 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and as discovery was
becoming an expensive burden, people were looking for ways to simplify
litigation.
Whatever the reason, there can be no denying that from Prima Paint
through the 2001 decision in CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 3 the Court has
systematically dismantled the remaining legal constraints that stood in the way
of the recognition of agreements to arbitrate, the enforcement of such
agreements, and the enforcement of the resulting arbitral awards. It has
federalized the law of arbitration to a degree astonishing to those who have
thought of the Rehnquist Court as the new expositor of states' rights and
federalism. It has expanded the availability of arbitration far beyond the law
merchant and collective bargaining to all parts of the non-criminal legal world,
so that it now encompasses, in addition to those traditional subjects, practically
all statutory claims, constitutional claims, consumer claims, and employee
claims. The Court has turned away efforts to place limits on what it takes to
form a pre-dispute contract for arbitration and has found voluntary consent to
Copyright © 2003, Diane P. Wood
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arbitration even if the contract was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
even if actual notice of the arbitration clause is doubtful, and even if there
were marked disparities in bargaining power between the parties.
It would be too much to say that a backlash has developed to the apparent
triumph of arbitration. But doubts are springing up that a one-size-fits-all
arbitral regime is optimal. Recent court decisions refusing to enforce some
kinds of arbitration agreements and some arbitral awards display a new
caution and concern for public policies that may be suffering as arbitration
sweeps across the legal landscape. In today's talk, I would like briefly to
review the key Supreme Court decisions that have brought us to where we are
today, and then turn to the new issues that those decisions have brought to the
fore and the skeptical undercurrents that can be detected in the courts. I
conclude that arbitration in the United States today is still a work-in-progress.
Some recalibration of the system is necessary and desirable if we are to reach
a socially acceptable balance between dispute resolution in the public
institutions known as courts and private dispute resolution that should be
entitled to public enforcement.
I. SUPREME COURT LANDMARKS

While the topic of arbitration arose from time to time in Supreme Court
decisions after the passage of the Arbitration Act in 1925, for the most part
the cases involved either industrial relations (especially in the railroad
industry, where the Railway Labor Act has long required a special form of
mediation and arbitration) or highly specialized areas, such as disputes
between states or admiralty cases. One interesting exception to that pattern,
however, arose in HardwareDealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co.,4 a
case involving the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that required
arbitration of the question of amount of loss in all fire insurance policies
written in that state. The Supreme Court upheld the state law over a challenge
based on the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It acknowledged that the arbitration process might not have
been strictly voluntary, because it was imposed by statute. Nevertheless, it
went on to say that "the procedure by which rights may be enforced and
wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control." 5 The
state rationally might have singled out amount of loss as a topic well suited to
arbitration procedures because of the frequency of disputes on that point, the
need for speedy determinations, and the special utility of expert knowledge.
The opinion concluded as follows:
"Granted, as we now hold, that the state, in the present circumstances, has
power to prescribe a summary method of ascertaining the amount of loss, the

4

284 U.S. 151 (1931).
Id. at 158.

HeinOnline -- 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 384 2003

BRAVE NEW WORLD

2003]

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, so far as now6 invoked, are
satisfied if the substitute remedy is substantial and efficient.",
The Court also added that the state was free to choose any kind of remedy
"provided its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it
adopts satisfies the constitutional requirements of reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard."7 The HardwareDealerscase thus stands as an early
example of a hospitable reception of arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution, albeit one with some important qualifications that may not have
lost their relevance.
The next important case, Wilko v. Swan,8 was decided in 1953. It posed
the question whether an arbitration agreement between a securities brokerage
firm and one of its customers was enforceable. The Supreme Court said "no",
on the ground that the agreement to arbitrate amounted to a waiver of rights
conferred by the Securities Act of 1933 and thus was void under section 14 of
that Act. The Court recognized that the United States Arbitration Act
"establish[ed] by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the
complications of litigation," 9 but it thought that the mere existence of the
arbitration statute did not resolve the question of the way it related to section
14 of the Securities Act. It rejected the respondent's argument that
"arbitration [was] merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law,"' 0
for several reasons. First, it thought that section 14 reflected the view of
Congress that buyers and sellers of securities would typically occupy unequal
bargaining positions and have asymmetrical access to information. Second,
waiver of ajudicial forum deprives the buyer of more options than it does the
seller. Third, there is no assurance in arbitration that the arbitrators would be
properly instructed in the law or that they would apply the law correctly. The
latter point was especially troublesome because section 10 of the Arbitration
Act, as the Court noted, provides for such a narrow range of review that
mistakes would go uncorrected. Finally, and most broadly, the Court
intimated (while reserving the point) that the right to select a forum might be
a substantive right in itself and that an agreement restricting that choice might
thwart the express purpose of the statute.
The next major arbitration case in the Supreme Court, PrimaPaint,"arose
out of a more conventional arbitral dispute: whether one party had performed
as required under a simple consulting services contract. The contract contained
a broad arbitration clause that required arbitration under the rules of the
6

Id. at 159.

7

Id. at 158.
346 U.S. 427 (1953); later overruled by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v.

8

Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
9
346 U.S. at 431.
10
Id. at 433.
"
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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American Arbitration Association over "[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof....,,12 The wrinkle
was that one party, Prima Paint, argued that the other party, Flood & Conklin,
had committed fraud in the inducement of the agreement that contained the
arbitration clause. Prima Paint took the position that a charge of fraud in the
inducement had to be resolved by the court before any arbitration of the
underlying claim could go forward. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that
section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required a court to order
arbitration to proceed once it was satisfied that the making of the agreement to
arbitrate was not at issue. In so holding, it distinguished sharply between a
challenge to the formation of the contract "generally" (which is all that Prima
Paint was asserting) and challenges to the formation of the agreement to
arbitrate within the contract: "We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a § 3
application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider
only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate." 3
This rule, the Court went on to state, was a rule of federal law, enacted
under the "incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty.""04 It therefore made no difference that the
case before it was a diversity case. The federal court was bound to apply the
FAA, and in the absence of any challenge to the making of the contract
generally, it was required to stay the litigation so that the arbitration could
proceed. Any other questions about fraud in the inducement generally could
be presented to the arbitrator.
While the tone of PrimaPaintwas indisputably more favorable toward
arbitration than had been the case in Wilko, that difference might have been
explained by the respective subject matters at hand: statutory claims, in Wilko,
versus private law, in PrimaPaint.Perhaps that explanation was accurate at
the time. But in the next key case, the Court took a cautious step toward
opening the door to the arbitration of statutory claims.
That case was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 5 which seemed like a reprise
of Wilko v. Swan with two potentially important differences: first, the claim
arose under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC
Rule 1Ob-5, and second, the transaction was an international one. Petitioner
Scherk was a German citizen residing in Switzerland; he transferred ownership
of three enterprises he owned to Alberto-Culver, along with certain warranties
relating to trademarks. The sales contract contained an arbitration clause
committing the parties to arbitrate any claims that arose out of their agreement
or its breach, using the facilities of the International Chamber of Commerce
12

Id. at 398.

13

Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).

14

15

HeinOnline -- 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 386 2003

BRAVE NEW WORLD

2003]

in Paris, and applying Illinois law. When problems arose about a year later,
Alberto-Culver sued in federal district court in Illinois for damages and other
relief, relying specifically on section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5. Scherk moved to dismiss for want of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, and on the basis offorum non conveniens, but most importantly
for present purposes, he also moved to stay the action pending ICC
arbitration. Alberto-Culver resisted on the basis of Wilko - an argument
accepted by both the district court and the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed and found that the arbitration clause was
enforceable. It offered a half-hearted distinction between section 14 of the
1933 Act and the comparable section of the 1934 Act, but it then assumed for
the sake of argument that the two were functionally identical. It was the
international aspect of the case that persuaded the Court to uphold the
arbitration arrangement. It noted the difficult choice of law questions that
could arise when the parties are from different countries; the conflicts over the
actual choice of forum; and the need to be able to structure international
business in an orderly fashion. As it had done for choice of judicial forum
clauses in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 16 it eschewed "a parochial
refusal ... to enforce an international arbitration agreement."' 7 Quoting from
The Bremen, the Court held that
[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in
effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that
posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be
used in resolving the dispute. The invalidation of such an
agreement in the case before us would not only allow the
respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as
well, reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts ....
This was one of the first times that the Court so frankly equated dispute
resolution in courts with dispute resolution in arbitral tribunals (though a hint
of that appears even in HardwareDealers),19 but it was not to be the last.
The Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating2 expanded
the availability of arbitration in a different way: at a stroke, the Court
federalized the law of arbitration and provided the basis for finding federal
preemption of any state law that purported to treat arbitration less favorably
than the FAA. Briefly, California had a franchise protection statute which, as
16

407 U.S. 1 (1972).

17

Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
Id. at 519 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).

18

19
20
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authoritatively construed by the California Supreme Court, made pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate disputes between franchisees and franchisors
unenforceable. The U.S. Supreme Court found that this law "directly
conflict[ed] with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violate[d] the
Supremacy Clause.'
It reasoned that the FAA as a whole rested "on the
authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause." 2 Substantive rules of this kind, it went on, must be applied in state
courts as well as federal courts. Congress would not have accomplished its
goal in 1925 of reversing the ancient hostility to arbitration agreements if it
had not ensured that the FAA norms had to be applied to state legislation as
well. It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor, joined by then-Justice
Rehnquist, dissented from this holding. She concluded that section 2 of the
FAA (which specifically says "[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of
the courts of the United States") was addressed only to the federal courts. Her
dissent closed with the following trenchant observation:
Today's decision is unfaithful to congressional intent,
unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA's antecedents and the
intervening contraction of federal power [referring to the
overruling of Swift v. Tyson in Erie], inexplicable. Although
arbitration is a worthy alternative to litigation, today's
exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far.23
After Southland,the pace of Supreme Court decisions encouraging the use
of arbitration quickened. Three cases eliminated any doubt about the
arbitrability of public law,24statutory claims: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
2
Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon,2 5
and Rodriguez de Quijasv. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc.26 Mitsubishiheld
that antitrust claims arising in an international context were arbitrable,
extending the rule of Scherk. McMahon held that domestic Exchange Act
cases arising under Rule lOb-5 were arbitrable, and then Rodriguez de Quijas
definitively overruled Wilko. Other equally important statutory claims received
the same treatment. In Gilmerv. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,27 the Supreme

Court held that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) could be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration agreement in a securities registration application. The Gilmer Court
21

Id. at 10.

22

Id.at 11.
Id.at 36.

23
24
25

26
27

473 U.S. 614 (1985).
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
500 U.S. 20 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 388 2003

BRAVE NEW WORLD

2003]

was not persuaded that the public policies embodied in the ADEA would be
undermined if these claims were resolved through arbitration, nor did it think
that arbitration would impinge upon the role of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. It also rejected the petitioner's procedural
objections to arbitration, including his claims that arbitral panels would be
biased, that discovery is limited in arbitration, that arbitrators did not have to
issue written opinions, that class actions were unavailable in arbitration, and
that arbitrators could not issue broad equitable relief. Finally, the Court had
this to say about the claim of disparities in bargaining power: "Mere
inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that
' 28
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. ,
Instead, such claims had to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
In two more cases, the Court underscored the point made in PrimaPaint
that arbitration clauses had to be considered separately from the rest of the
contract: Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,29 and Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto30 . Applying the principle of broad federal
preemption it had announced in Southland,the Court held that states could
not adopt specific statutes invalidating arbitration clauses; only the kind of
flaw that would invalidate a general contract could be used to strike down
such a clause. As the Court put it in Allied-Bruce, the basic purpose of the
FAA was "tout arbitration provisions on the same footing as a contract's
other terms." In that case, its decision to apply the broadest possible
interpretation of the Commerce Clause to a contract between a bug
extermination company and a homeowner caused it to find the FAA
applicable and preemptive of an Alabama statute making written, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. Doctor'sAssociates did the
same thing with a Montana statute that merely provided that arbitration
clauses would be unenforceable unless they were typed in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract.
At least one remaining question existed about the reach of the FAA until
2001: what did section 1 mean when it excluded from coverage "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"? 32 Every court of appeals except
the Ninth Circuit had held that this exempted contracts of employment for
transportation workers, but not for any others. The Ninth Circuit thought
otherwise, and so the Supreme Court took the case of CircuitCity Stores, Inc.
v. Adams 33 to resolve the conflict.
28

Id. at 33.

29
30

513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
Id. at 275 (internal quotations omitted).
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
532 U.S. 105 (2001).

31

32
33
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In Circuit City, the Court reviewed once again the history of the FAA,
reiterating that it "was a response to hostility of American courts to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, a judicial disposition inherited from
then-longstanding English practice. 34 Using a variety of canons of statutory
construction, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's reading of the text
of the statute was wrong. The exemption was the narrow one understood to
exist in the other courts of appeals. It brushed aside the amicus curiae
submission by the attorneys general of 22 states, who had argued that the
inclusion of ordinary employment agreements under the FAA would intrude
too deeply on the policies of the several states. As for that, the Court replied,
their quarrel was with Southland's preemption finding, and their remedy lay
in Congress.
Only a few glimmers of caution have appeared in this otherwise
impressive story of support for arbitration from the Supreme Court. One was
in Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University.35 In Volt, the parties had entered into a construction contract under
which Volt was to install some electrical conduits on the campus of Stanford
University. The contract had an arbitration clause, and it also had a choice-oflaw clause that said simply that "[t]he Contract shall be governed by the law
of the place where the Project is located. 36 That place was, of course,
California. Problems arose; Volt filed a formal demand for arbitration; and
Stanford responded with a state court action against Volt for fraud and breach
of contract. Stanford's complaint also named two other defendants with whom
it did not have arbitration agreements. Volt petitioned the state court for an
order compelling arbitration, while Stanford asked the court to stay the Volt
arbitration pending the resolution of the related litigation against the
additional parties. The court did so, and the question whether that action was
compatible with the FAA reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
Finding that the FAA, while preempting state laws, did not "occupy the
entire field" of arbitration altogether, the Court held that the California law
permitting the stay of arbitration was not preempted under the circumstances
of this case. It placed considerable weight on the fact that the parties had
agreed to use California law, and said that "[it does not follow that the FAA
prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than
those set forth in the Act itself. 3 7 It went on to hold that
[w]here, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state
rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of
34
35

Id.at 111.
489 U.S. 468 (1989).

36

Id.

37

Id. at 479.
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the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where
the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.3 8

Volt is not an anti-arbitration decision by any stretch of the imagination,
but it offers a possible avenue back toward state laws that may be more
protective of the arbitral process than might have seemed possible for a time.
Another decision was also more nuanced. In FirstOptions of Chicago,Inc. v.
Kaplan,3 9 the Court confirmed the fact that courts still have a role to play in
both the referral of cases to arbitration and in the decision whether to confirm
an arbitral award. Not uncommonly, a dispute will arise about the question
whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitration at all: is there an
arbitration agreement? does it cover these parties? does it cover this subject
matter? The Court recognized that the question of who will decide "whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate" is central. If the parties did not agree to submit
that threshold question to arbitration, then (as had been true for many years in
the area of labor arbitration) the court will decide independently. If they did
agree that the arbitrator would resolve even arbitrability issues (and the court
would have to decide at least this much), then that is what must happen. In
making that determination, the court applies ordinary state-law contract law.
It does so, however, without the usual strong presumption in favor of
arbitration. The strong pro-arbitration presumption is reversed here: "[c]ourts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there
is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so. ''4O This is done because
arbitration is a creature of agreement; without an agreement to arbitrate, it
cannot exist. With respect to the second issue - standard of review for courts
of appeals reviewing district court decisions about confirmation of awards the Court held that ordinary standards should apply. There is no reason to give
extra leeway to district courts that uphold arbitral awards.
This is hardly a comprehensive look at the Supreme Court's decisions in
the area of arbitration. It is enough, however, to make the point that the Court
has taken strong positions on the acceptability of arbitration as a co-equal
method of dispute resolution, on the preemptive force of the FAA as an
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power out to the furthest limits, on
the typical inability of the states in the face of this federal legislation to enact
arbitration-specific regimes that are less favorable to the process than the
FAA would be, and on the lack of any subject-matter restrictions on arbitrable
claims. Against this background, we can turn to the issues courts are
grappling with today. Some of these will look familiar, and some are newer,
but all take on extra importance as arbitration itself becomes a firmly
established part of the legal landscape.
38

39
40

Id.
514 U.S. 938, 947 (1996).
Id.
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II. CURRENT ISSUES
In the area of international trade regulation, which I have spent some time
studying, the metaphor of a lake whose water level falls is common-place. It
is used to describe the discovery of barriers to international trade that were
hidden before formal tariffs or quantitative restrictions were abolished. As the
tariff level - or water - falls, new problems become visible. With the lake,
those newly visible things may be rocks or crevasses that no one realized
were there before; with trade barriers, they might be private arrangements that
impede international trade. I suggest that the same metaphor might help us
understand what is happening today with arbitration. There is no doubt that
the FAA, as it has been construed by the Supreme Court for more than three
quarters of a century, has solved the problem of court hostility to arbitration
and other alternative methods of dispute resolution. But, just as with our lake,
the decrease in hostility to arbitration has revealed a new set of issues that
must be addressed, lest we find ourselves simply trading one set of difficulties
for another. Many of these newer problems are showing up in cases presently
before the courts. What follows is my own list of some of the more significant
ones I have observed.
A. ArbitrationAgreements
The first set of issues, not surprisingly, concerns the arbitration
agreement. Is there an agreement at all between these parties? If so, how
much does it cover? Who are the parties, and despite the statements from the
Supreme Court just reviewed, should it matter if they are unequal? Who will
pay for the arbitration? Is one payment system inherently more fair than
another? What law will govern the agreement and the arbitrators?
1. Scope of the arbitrationagreement
Because the entire edifice of arbitration law is built upon agreement, it is
appropriate for courts to compel arbitration only when the subject matter of
the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. The Supreme Court
indicated as much in FirstOptions, among many other cases. Section 2 of the
FAA expressly refers to a "contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy," or other kinds of agreements
in writing to submit disputes to arbitration. 4 ' This may seem like a mere
formality, but it is not. Agreements to arbitrate disputes "arising out of" a
contract are narrower than agreements to arbitrate disputes "arising out of or
related to" a contract. A dispute resolution clause that commits the parties to
arbitrate any "invoice amount" does not obligate the parties to arbitrate claims
about unlawful retention of documents.42
41

9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

42

See Welbom Clinic v. Medquist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2002).

HeinOnline -- 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 392 2003

BRAVE NEW WORLD

20031

Another question that can arise is whether the parties in question have
entered into an agreement at all. This was the issue in a recent Seventh Circuit
case, InternationalBrotherhoodofElectricalWorkers, Local 176 v. Balmoral
Racing Club, Inc.43 In that case, a company had terminated an agreement with
one union, and then had begun-working with another group of workers under
the same terms and conditions." One of those terms was an arbitration
agreement. 45 The company argued that the agreement never extended to the
new workers, while the union argued that it did.46 Relying on the agreement's
provisions for determining disputed issues of coverage, the court ruled that
the workers were covered by the arbitration agreement.47
2. Fee arrangements
One of the most important current issues concerns the way in which the
costs of arbitration will be allocated. For years, the Supreme Court and other
courts have assumed that arbitration is an inexpensive, speedy alternative to
traditional court dispute resolution. But that may be too simplistic. The first
question is, compared to what kind of court? A court of general jurisdiction?
A small claims court? The second is what kinds of costs should be
anticipated. Discovery costs may be higher in the courts (although in this era
of ever-increasing judicial management of the pre-trial process, that may be
less true than it once was), but there is often some discovery in arbitration as
well. If there is not, then a problem of a different character may exist, relating
to the fairness of the overall procedure. I consider that in a few moments.
Courts, as public institutions, are close to free: the price of admission is a
small filing fee. Judges are not paid by the parties. Arbitrators, of course,
work for pay. If the procedure is being handled by a single arbitrator, the fees
may be more manageable, but if a panel of three arbitrators is used, fees can
mount quickly. In some small claims cases, arbitration may not be any less
expensive than the judicial process; it might be more.
The Supreme Court touched lightly
48 on this subject in Green Tree
FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph. In that case, the Court looked at the
question "whether an arbitration agreement that does not mention arbitration
costs and fees is unenforceable because it fails affirmatively to protect a party
from potentially steep arbitration costs. ' 49 In keeping with its usual reluctance
to make generalized anti-arbitration assumptions, the Court declined to make
any systematic assumptions. But, it noted, "[i]t may well be that the existence

46

293 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.

47

Id. at 407-08.

43
44

45

48

531 U.S. 79 (2000).

49

Id. at 82.
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of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. 5 °
Faced with a lack of information in the record about the actual costs the
plaintiff would bear, the Court could not find the agreement unenforceable on
that ground. 51 To hold otherwise, it remarked, would undermine the liberal
federal policy in favor of arbitration and would be inconsistent with earlier
rulings imposing the burden of proof on the party who argues that certain
issues are unsuitable for arbitration. 2 Footnote 6 of the opinion explains the
deficiencies in the plaintiff's proof; it strongly indicates that parties attacking
arbitration on cost grounds had better be prepared with detailed information to
back up their arguments."
Courts have not been sure what to make of Green Tree's rule. On the one
hand, if parties are required to split costs evenly, the arbitration may be
unduly burdensome to a consumer or employee party. Worse, a rigid rule of
fifty-fifty cost-sharing might be inconsistent with statutes such as Title VII
that give a right to 100% of attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff.5 4 Yet
parties can waive many rights - even constitutional rights - if they do so with
their eyes open, and so some courts have wondered why the right to receive
attorneys' fees cannot also be waived in an arbitration agreement. 55 But, on
the other hand, if the more powerful party pays 100% of the fees to the
arbitrator or the arbitral body, is the process itself distorted? Can the arbitrator
under those circumstances be unbiased, or is he or she more like the judge in
the old case of Tumey v. Ohio,56 who was paid from the fines he collected
(and who the Supreme Court said was not the unbiased decisionmaker that the
due process clause guarantees)? Perhaps the most that can be said with
confidence is that when arbitration moves away from the classic areas of
commercial transactions between roughly equal parties and collective
bargaining agreements, where the existence of the union assures much the
same equality, new problems related to costs become apparent and are starting
to demand resolution.
3. Type ofparties
This takes us to the next question: who are the parties in modem
arbitration settings? No one has dropped out of the picture, to be sure.
Arbitration still plays a key role in the law of industrial relations. Its
50

Id. at 90.

5'

Id. at 91.
Id.

52

53

Id. at 90 n.6.
See, e.g., McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (separate
opinions discussing this point).
55
See Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int'l Inc.,
294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002).
56 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
54
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importance has always been great in international business transactions, and
there is no reason to anticipate a change in that fact. Organized markets have
used arbitration since the time of Medieval England, and they continue to do
so today. What is different, at least in the American experience, is the extent
to which arbitration is being imposed on consumers, credit card holders,
employees, and other individual parties who generally lack any ability to
negotiate or to resist any term of the trade. The American Arbitration
Association recognizes the differing dynamics between commercial and
consumer arbitration, and it has developed separate rules for each type. That
distinction has not yet made a formal appearance in judicial decisions,
however, and the Supreme Court's Green Tree decision and its rulings in
analogous cases like Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 57 which upheld a
choice-of-forum clause in a consumer transaction even though the clause
appeared in tiny print and was buried in the back of a cruise ticket, indicate
that the Court is not ready to take that step yet.
4. Governing law
Although it may seem too late in the day to question whether the FAA has
full preemptive force over state laws that attempt to protect consumers,
franchisees, employees, or others with a perceived lack of bargaining power
from having arbitration imposed upon them, given the Supreme Court's
repeated reaffirmations ofSouthland,one should not make hasty assumptions.
Some might have thought that the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment
was well settled before the Court decided Seminole Tribe in 1996,58 but they
would have been wrong. Lopez 59 was another unexpected constriction on
60
Congress's Commerce Clause power, and a few years later, Morrison
underscored the fact that detailed congressional findings about the effect of
the prohibited practice on interstate commerce were not going to dissuade the
Court from making an independent determination. While no one (to my
knowledge) expects that the Court will conclude that some transactions perhaps like the home termite inspection contract in Allied-Bruce61 - have
such a minimal effect on interstate commerce that Congress cannot reach
them, other forms of retrenchment are possible. For example, in Jones v. United
States,62 the Court concluded that the federal statute criminalizing arson of a
building that affected interstate commerce had to be construed narrowly, lest
constitutional questions arise. 63 There is nothing to prevent the Court from re57

499 U.S. 585 (1991).

58

517 U.S. 44 (1996).

59
60

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
529 U.S. 848 (2000).
Id. at 858.

61
62
63
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visiting its expansive interpretation of section 2 of the FAA (which several
members of the Court have continued to criticize, even as they respect the rule
of stare decisis) and deciding that the FAA does not have the broad
substantive preemptive force it is now given.
B. Arbitral Process
A second broad set of issues that is moving to the fore has to do with the
procedures that govern the actual arbitration proceeding. Traditionally, this is
a subject that has been left to the parties. Some arbitration agreements call for
the use of an off-the-shelf set of procedures, such as the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, or the International Chamber of Commerce, or the
United National Conference on International Trade Law (known commonly
as UNCITRAL); others say nothing at all on the subject, and allow the
arbitrator to make up the rules as he or she goes along; while others are using
the facilities of industry-specific organizations, such as the National
Association of Securities Dealers.6 4 However the rules are chosen, they are
coming under increasing scrutiny.
1. Who are the arbitrators?
The first question relates to the identity and qualifications of the
arbitrators. If the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to a single
arbitrator, then there is a premium on assuring that this person will be an
unbiased decisionmaker. If they have agreed to use three arbitrators, then
commonly each party will be entitled to designate a party-arbitrator, and then
some system will be used to select the neutral tie-breaker. Courts have found
no fault with the presence of the party-arbitrators on the panel 65; that system
simply focuses attention on the third arbitrator. For present purposes, there is
no need to distinguish between the single arbitrator and the third neutral.
Established arbitral institutions like the AAA maintain lists of qualified
arbitrators, have rules for the disclosure of conflicts of interest, and otherwise
have measures in place to assure that the arbitrator can command the trust and
respect of both parties. The risks in this area come more from the ad hoc
procedures or from institutions operated by representatives of only one side of
potential disputes: industry associations, employer associations, or even lists
of arbitrators created only by the party with greater resources. Courts have not
See, e.g., Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1998) (investor claims were
arbitrable under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure).
65
See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir.
64

2002). This opinion goes even further than the statement in the text. It states that "[t]o the extent
that an agreement entitles parties to select interested (even beholden) arbitrators, section
10(a)(2) [of the FAA, reproduced below] has no role to play." Id. at 620. Not all judges would
subscribe to the last comment, at least if it were extended to a single party's imposition of an
interested arbitrator upon another party who had no ability to prevent such a choice.
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wanted to assume partiality in these arrangements, but it is easy to detect an
unease that has prompted some courts to refuse to enforce awards in the more
egregious situations.
2. Development of the facts
One of the most important differences between arbitral procedures and
court procedures is the absence of traditional American-style discovery in the
former. This is surely a major contributor to the cost savings that are thought
to accompany arbitration (although it would be helpful if someone would
undertake a rigorous study of the cost differences between the two systems,
adjusting for type of case, to see if there is any empirical basis for the
assumption). But there is a dark underside to this too. Without the powers of
the court behind the weaker party, it can be very difficult to gather
information in the opponent's possession that may throw important light on
the case. Even in a straightforward employment dispute, where the plaintiff
believes that she was not promoted because of her age, or her gender, or her
religion, it is often necessary to find out how the employer has treated others
similarly situated to the plaintiff. No litigant wants to turn over unfavorable
information to an opponent, but the courts can take steps to ensure that required
discovery takes place. Arbitrators do not have the same power to do so, and the
arbitral rules used often place strict limits on document discovery, the number of
depositions that will be permitted, and the matters that may be explored.
3. Confidentiality
The courts, as everyone knows, are public institutions. One of the prices
of submitting a dispute for resolution in a court is the loss of privacy that
would otherwise exist. If there is a legitimate reason to restrict distribution of
certain materials, it is of course possible to obtain a protective order from the
court, but protective orders are not granted promiscuously. Broad stipulations
that materials will be maintained under seal are not good enough for the
appellate courts, which insist that the parties explain, document by document
and paragraph by paragraph, if necessary, why the presumption of open courts
should be disregarded in their case.
Arbitration is completely different. Everything, from the content of the
demand for arbitration, through the materials submitted before the hearing,
the hearing, and the ultimate reasons for the disposition, can be, and often is,
maintained in absolute confidence. Indeed, this is an important reason why
arbitration is attractive to many parties. Employers might like to keep a veil
over information like how many discrimination complaints are filed against
them; doctors might like information about malpractice allegations to be hard
or impossible to find; manufacturers might like to prevent information about
product liability settlements from seeing the light of day; and franchisors might
66

Some of those cases are discussed below.
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like to keep the details of their disputes with franchisees secret. If so, then
arbitration holds great attraction for them. Employees, patients, customers,
and franchisees may see fewer benefits in the confidentiality provisions - and
it is a fair bet that the plaintiffs' bar is no fan of arbitral secrecy.
4. Written explanations of results
While courts have expressed comparatively little concern with arbitral
confidentiality, the absence of any requirement in the FAA or elsewhere in
the law for arbitrators to offer an explanation of their decision has become a
source of increasing attention. This may not have been a problem, and it may
not even now be a problem, when private parties are resolving private
contractual disputes. In such cases, the law is relatively indifferent to the
ultimate truth of the matter - who was right, who was wrong, who breached,
who shipped a defective product - and instead it emphasizes the social
harmony that comes from successful dispute resolution. Statutory claims are
different. No one would argue that society as a whole is uninterested in the
accurate and fair application of the laws forbidding discrimination on
invidious grounds, or the laws regulating securities markets and transactions,
or the antitrust laws, or the laws governing consumer credit transactions. Yet
how can anyone be sure that those laws were competently and accurately
applied in an arbitration proceeding, if no one knows whether one arbitrator
flipped a coin to reach his result, or if another arbitrator conducted a
painstaking study of the relevant rules and reached a reasoned conclusion.
And even in the case of the second arbitrator, what if that reasoned conclusion
turns out to be wrong? District court judges are required to do no less, and
they are reversed from time to time by appellate courts (something like 15%
of the time, if the statistics from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
paint a representative picture). The combination of confidentiality and the
lack of a requirement for an explanation (written or recorded on an accurate
transcript) create a troubling possibility of important public laws that may be
unenforced, or mistakenly enforced.
5. Costs (again)
Even if the parties have not specified in their arbitration agreement how
to allocate costs, along the lines discussed above, costs can arise as a problem
within the arbitration proceeding itself. Someone will have to decide who
pays the arbitrator's fees, who pays the other fixed costs of conducting the
proceedings (such as rent for the space used, storage for documents, and the
like), and how attorneys' fees will be allocated. For the reasons already
mentioned, the way in which these costs are distributed can affect the overall
accessibility of the arbitral procedure to aggrieved parties.
C. Recognition and Enforcement ofAwards
No case could have emphasized more strongly that the presumption in
favor of arbitration operates at its strongest at the beginning of the process,
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when a court is faced with the question whether to compel arbitration (or to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate), than did Mitsubishi v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth.67 In that decision, the Supreme Court found reason in the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards to compel arbitration of an international antitrust dispute, relying on
Article II, paragraph 1, of the Convention.6 8 The Court recognized that a panel
of Japanese arbitrators applying Swiss law (the law chosen in the contract at
issue) might not give full force to U.S. antitrust laws, but it said that any such
problem could be addressed at the end of the process, when the winning party
sought recognition and enforcement of the eventual award. It seems, however,
that the Court may have been unduly optimistic about the practical
availability of post-arbitral review, either under the New York Convention or
under the FAA itself. For a number of good reasons, most having to do with
the preservation of arbitration as a true alternative to the courts, and not just a
preliminary step along a long road, courts have read the FAA as imposing
very strict restrictions on the grounds that would justify overturning an
arbitral award.6 9 With few exceptions, therefore, once a case has been
entrusted to arbitration, no court will ever do anything with it again.
1. FAA standardof review
Perhaps the best illustration of the point just made comes from the text of
the FAA itself. Section 10(a) sets forth the grounds on which a court is
permitted to set aside or vacate an arbitral award. It reads as follows:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
See id. at 639. The New York Convention was implemented in the United States, in
Chapter 2 of Title 9 of the U.S. Code. See 9 U.S.C. §§201 et.seq.
69
See, e.g., Flexible Mfg. Systems Pty. Ltd. v. Super Products Corp., 86 F.3d 96 (7th
67
68

Cir. 1996) ("If courts were to undertake the kind of searching review of arbitral awards that
Super Products invites here, arbitration would be transformed from a commercially useful
alternative method of dispute resolution into a burdensome additional step on the march through
the court system.").
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shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.7 °
This is hardly a long list. Conspicuously absent from it are grounds such
as mistake of fact (even under a deferential standard of review like the
"clearly erroneous" rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52),71 mistake of
law, abuse of discretion, or any other familiar theory that might prompt a
party to take an appeal from an adverse result in a trial court. The first ground
- corruption, fraud, or "undue means" - is fairly self-explanatory and
(thankfully) does not arise often. The second, as noted above, has been
construed narrowly by courts. "Evident" partiality means something far worse
than an appearance of impropriety.72 Similarly, while section 10(a)(3) might
seem to invite serious review of the actual conduct of the arbitral proceeding,
ranging from rulings on motions for extensions of time, to discovery disputes,
to handling of witnesses, that is not how the courts have construed it.
Mistakes are not the same thing as "misconduct," and only the latter would
permit judicial intervention. The last ground, in contrast, has some bite. If the
arbitrators went beyond the scope of the arbitral agreement, then they
exceeded their powers. Courts will refuse to enforce arbitral awards that
cannot be traced to the parties' agreement to arbitrate. They may also refuse
to enforce an award that is so vague, or inconclusive, or interlocutory, that no
one can tell what it requires.
2. Review for mistakes offact
As already noted, straightforward review for mistakes of fact simply does
not happen. Parties on both sides should realize that when they bargain for
arbitration, they are bargaining for the decision of one and only one body on
the facts of their case. Objectively speaking, this is not a factor that necessarily
will favor one side or the other. In an employment case, for example, if the
arbitrator chooses to believe the complaining party's version of the events, the
70

9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).

71
72

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.

As the decision in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. All American Life Insurance Co.,
307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002), pointed out, there is some value still in comparing the standards
for disqualifying judges with the standards to be used in assessing arbitrator impartiality. If a
judge similarly situated to the challenged arbitrator would not have to recuse herself, then it is
clear that the arbitrator did not have the kind of "evident partiality" that would require
disqualification. Id.at 622. It is the converse that is not true: under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000),
there will be instances in which a judge would have to recuse herself, but that do not rise to the
level of "evident partiality."
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employer might wish it had another chance. This aspect of arbitration has
been widely accepted, even though the arbitrator's findings of fact will be
influenced by the evidence the parties are able to collect, and thus might
reflect an unconscious bias toward the side with better access to the
information.
3. Review for mistakes of law: "manifest disregard"
Courts also refuse to review arbitral awards for mistakes of law - or at
least, for ordinary mistakes of law. Review of legal conclusions is not among
the grounds listed in FAA section 10(a), and one might think that this is the
end of matters. It is not. As far back as Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court
suggested that an arbitrator's "manifest disregard" of legal rules might justify
judicial intervention.7 3 But this has proven to be a difficult standard to apply,
because it requires courts to draw the line between the kinds of mistakes of
law that fall outside the boundaries ofjudicial review, and those that are either
different in kind or so different in degree that they represent "manifest"
disregard.
The Second Circuit confronted this problem squarely in Greenbergv.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 74 where it offered the following reconciliation between
section 10 and this additional ground of judicial review:
The FAA and federal case law supply various bases for
review of an arbitral award. Section 10 itself lists several
grounds, including fraud in procuring the award; corruption,
partiality, or prejudicial misconduct on the part of the
arbitrators; abuse of power; and failure to render 'a mutual,
final, and definite award.' 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Judicial
interpretation has added additional grounds, such that awards
may be vacated under limited circumstances where the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law . . . or where
enforcement would
violate a "well defined and dominant
75
public policy.
It went on to say that manifest disregard existed only if the reviewing
court found "both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle
yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the
arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case. 76
The Seventh Circuit has taken a far more circumscribed approach to the
"manifest disregard" standard. In George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany &
73
74
75
76

346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 26-27 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 28.
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77

Co.,
the court, relying to a significant degree on the Supreme Court's
decision in EasternAssociatedCoal Corp. v. UnitedMine Workers,7 8 offered
the following alternative interpretation to the idea of "manifest disregard"
review:

...[A]n arbitrator may not direct the parties to violate the
law. In the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties' agent and
as their delegate may do anything the parties may do
directly.79
Under this standard, the arbitrator who knows about the law and
deliberately refuses to follow it is insulated unless the legal norm in question
is an unwaivable, mandatory rule of law and the failure to enforce it amounts
to an order to do something illegal. As the concurring judge in George Watts
noted, this is a major step to take. 80 The conflict in the circuits that this may
have created continues to exist. All that can be said at present is that there is a
felt need in many quarters for some avenue of judicial review for the worst
instances of misapplication of public regulatory laws, but that will be more
readily available in some parts of the country than in others.
4. Publicpolicy review
Although, as the Second Circuit pointed out in Greenberg, U.S. courts
have added "public policy" to the list found in section 10, in this instance
foreign arbitral awards stand on a somewhat different footing. 81 The New
York Convention, like the FAA, spells out the reason why recognition and
enforcement of an award falling under the Convention may be rejected, and
the list is not quite the same as the one in the FAA. Article V of the
Convention reads as follows:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
as the request of the party against whom it is invoked only if
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II
were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
77
78

248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
531 U.S. 57 (2000) ("we must treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an

agreement between the parties themselves").
79
248 F.3d at 580.
80
George Watts, 248 F.3d at 581 (Williams, J. concurring).
81
Greenberg v. Bear, Stems & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000).
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(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated
by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties,
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority
of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition and enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.8 2

Aside from the point that is immediately relevant here, which is that the
Convention expressly recognizes in Article V.2(b) that public policy is a valid
reason for refusing to enforce an arbitral award, while FAA section 10 does
not, it is worth comparing the result of the reasons set forth in Article V to
their counterpart in section 10 as well. The Convention appears to give more
flexibility to reviewing courts to assess which subject matters are capable of
resolution by arbitration, whether the parties received adequate notice of
proceedings, whether there were disqualifying flaws in the arbitral procedure,
and a number of other points that have arisen in domestic cases. To the extent
that the spread of arbitration prompts study of the domestic regime in the
82

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, June
7, 1959, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; 9 U.S.C. §201 note.
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United States, it may be fruitful to look at experience around the world with
the New York Convention to see if some cross-fertilization from the
international system would be desirable. Internationally, it would have been
unthinkable not to provide for a "public policy" safety valve, when courts are
asked to enforce an award made in a different country, under different rules.
Whether such a rule exists for domestic proceedings (particularly given the
scope of federal preemption that presently exists, which leaves no room for
states to have different public policies) is just as debatable as the "manifest
disregard" rule.
5. Fundamentalfairnessreview
Fundamental fairness might refer to substantive outcomes, or it might
refer to the procedures used. If it is the former, then we run back into the
problem of the essential unreviewability of facts and law, except to the extent
that there is a "manifest disregard" exception. If it is the latter, then it is
necessary to look at section 10 again to see what kinds of procedural
protections it affords. The answer is that it provides some protection: parties
are guaranteed an arbitrator who does not display "evident partiality," they
are assured a procedure that is free from fraud and corruption, and they may
obtain relief from awards in excess of the arbitrator's powers. On the
procedural side, the best way to make sense of a "fundamental fairness"
ground for review would be to consult the basic due process decisions of the
Supreme Court, look for the bare minimum, and see whether that level is
assured. Notice, an unbiased decisionmaker, and an opportunity to be heard
are generally considered the bedrock principles of due process, and these may
not be beyond the reach of a reviewing court, if the party attacking the award
can demonstrate that they were absent.
6. Agreements to expand FAA review
Last in our list of newer developments is the possibility that the parties
might be able to contract for more comprehensive judicial review than the
FAA or other sources of positive law like the New York Convention give
them. The idea is simple: if arbitration is really a creature of agreement, then
why can parties not agree to judicial review of their arbitral award - plenary
review, limited review, or something in between. Like many superficially
simple ideas, however, this one sits on top of a more complex reality. At
present, there is a conflict in the circuits over the permissibility of this
maneuver. The Seventh, Eighth and the Tenth Circuits take the position that
private parties cannot modify the public process of judicial review through
private agreements.8 3 In contrast, the Fifth8 4 and Ninth85 Circuits have seen
83

See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); UHC Mgmt. Co.

v. Computer Sciences, 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998); and Chi. Typographical Union v. Chi.
Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
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enhanced judicial review as consistent with the broader preference for private
ordering (cafeteria-style public judicial services?) and honoring party
agreements. The desire to be able to modify the FAA is understandable
enough. Most of the criticisms one hears have to do with the fact the,
important public policies are being developed without any way of ensuring
consistency and faithfulness to the purpose and intent of the statutes. If there
were a way to move back into the court system at the endpoint, that problem
would be solved. But it is a big step to assume that parties can pick and
choose the procedural rules of the court that will apply to them. The question
of what kinds of orders are appealable, and at what point in a proceeding, is
one of the most important procedural rules courts have. Whether private
agreements can opt back into the court system at the appellate level under the
law as it now stands, and if not, whether it is even desirable to make that
change in the law, is an issue intimately tied up with the scope of section 10
in the first place. My own view is that it would be preferable to work directly
on amendments to section 10, if any change is to occur, than to create or
expand a doctrine of optional appellate review.

III. RUMBLINGS IN THE COURTS
It would be wrong to overstate the current significance of the concerns
about arbitration that have just been reviewed. The courts still regularly
enforce agreements to arbitrate; they stay proceedings or dismiss them
outright so that arbitration can take place; and they enforce arbitral awards
even when they are told convincingly that the arbitrator made mistakes of fact
or law. At the same time, as the review of Supreme Court cases illustrates, the
field within which arbitration operates has expanded to cover virtually
everything except the criminal law. But lately, in a surprising number of
appellate courts, one finds decisions refusing to go along with arbitration
systems that seem too unfair, declining to recognize agreements to arbitrate in
arrangements that appear to the court to be unconscionable, finding a lack of
consideration to support particular agreements to arbitrate, and for other
reasons declining to take arbitration out to its logical limits. These decisions
may be nothing more than the exceptions that prove the rule, or they may be
the harbingers of a more serious re-thinking of the law of arbitration. It is
worth knowing that they are out there, however, because in the aggregate they
suggest that arbitration (like free markets) cannot be utterly unregulated.
What follows is a brief overview of the cases that have balked at supporting
arbitration in one way or the other.
A. Fees
Once again, because of the prevalence of the fee issue, I begin there. Five
decisions have found problems in one way or the other with one-sided fee
84

s

Gateway. Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1997).
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arrangements. The earliest was Cole v. Burns International Securities
Services.86 In that case, the D.C. Circuit held that an employer may not
condition employment on the employee's acceptance of an arbitration
agreement that requires the employee to submit his or her statutory claims to
arbitration and to pay all or part of the arbitrator's fees. 87 The Tenth Circuit
ruled similarly in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance. Management. of Colorado,
Inc., 88 when it held that a mandatory arbitration agreement that was entered
into as a condition of continued employment, and which required the
employee to pay just a portion of the arbitrator's fees, was unenforceable
under the FAA. 9Another case in which the imposition of the responsibility to
pay fees on the employee was potentially fatal to the enforcement of the
arbitral agreement was the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bradfordv. Rockwell
SemiconductorSystems, Inc. 90 That court held that a fee splitting provision in
an employment agreement that required the employee to share the costs of
arbitration could, but did not necessarily, render a mandatory arbitration
agreement unenforceable if the arbitration fees and costs would be so high
that they would effectively deny the employee access to the arbitral forum. 9'
That, of course, is what the Supreme Court also said in Green Tree. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in McCaskill v. SCI Management. Corp., 92 while
the product of a deeply split panel, concluded that a provision in an arbitration
agreement requiring each party to pay its own costs and attorneys' fees was
unenforceable, in the face of the statutory right of prevailing plaintiffs in Title
VII cases to obtain their fees.93 Another panel of the Seventh Circuit then
questioned this result,94 but the point here is less about where the law of the
Seventh Circuit may be at the moment and more about the prevalence of
expressed concerns on the fee question. Finally, when the Ninth Circuit
received the CircuitCity case on remand from the Supreme Court, it refused
to enforce the arbitration agreement on a number of grounds. 95 One of the
grounds that contributed to the court's conclusion that the arbitration
agreement was substantively unconscionable was the fact 96that it required the
employee to split the arbitrator's fees with the employer.
86

105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

87

Id. at 1483-84.

88

163 F.3d 1230 (l0th Cir. 1999).

89

Id. at 1233-34.

90

238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).

91

Id. at 554.

92

298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002).

93
94

Id. at 680-86.
See Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc.,
294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002).
95
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
96

Id. at 894.
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B. Employer-biasedprocess
The fee-splitting requirement was not the only problem with the Circuit
City agreement, as the Ninth Circuit saw it. Overall, it thought that the process
was unacceptably biased in favor of the employer. 97 It unilaterally forced
employees to arbitrate all employment-related claims against the employer,
but it placed no such restriction on the employer's choice of forum; it limited
the relief available only to employees; it had the fee-splitting rule just noted;
and it imposed a strict one-year statute of limitations on arbitrating claims,
which was narrower than the time period they would have had for continuing
violations under California law. 98 The agreement the Fourth Circuit refused to
enforce in HootersofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips9 9 was also transparently biased
in favor of the employer. The Hooters arbitration rules required, among other
things, that all arbitrators be selected from a list created by the employer, that
there would be no limits on who Hooters could place on the list, that
employees had to give notice of claims but that Hooters did not have to give
notice of its defenses, and that only Hooters could expand the scope of the
proceedings.10 0 The Fourth Circuit found these rules so egregiously unfair that
they represented a complete default of the employer's contractual obligation
to draft the rules in good faith.' 0' Another case in which a court found
02
unacceptably biased rules was Ticknor v. Choice Hotels International,Inc. 1
Under Montana law, the court found, the arbitration clause before it was
unconscionable. 0 3 The clause was contained in a standardized, form franchise
agreement between a hotel chain and an operator. 10 4 Under this agreement,
the chain could bring any claims against the operator in state or federal court,
but the operator was forced to submit all claims to binding arbitration at the
chain's Maryland headquarters.
C. General unconscionability/unfairness
Many of the cases focusing on the one-sidedness of an agreement also use
the rhetoric of unconscionability: CircuitCity on remand and Ticknor are two
examples of this.' 0 5 Several district courts have also refused to enforce
arbitration agreements on general unconscionability grounds. In Lozada v.
97
98

Id.
Id.

99

173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 938.
101 Id.
102
265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
103 Id. at 939-40.

10o

104

Id. at 935.

1o5

See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) and Ticknor, 265

F.3d at 93 1.
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Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc.,'0 6 the district court found that an arbitration
clause in a retail installment sales and security agreement relating to
automobile sales was substantively unreasonable and unconscionable under
Michigan law. 0 7 The clause provided for the waiver by buyers of the right to
proceed by way of a class action. The court thought that this provision denied
buyers the opportunity to sue as a group that those the federal Truth-inLending Act guarantees, as well as compromising their rights under state
consumer protection law.108 Linguistic difficulties prompted a district court in
Texas to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement. 0 9 In Prevot v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., employees who did not understand English had been
pressured to sign arbitration agreements. 10 The agreements were not
translated for them, and the court found that they did not know what they
were signing."' Under the circumstances, the court found the agreements to
be procedurally unconscionable under Texas law. 1 2 Another district court
wrote more broadly in Rollins, Inc. v. Foster." 3 Again along Green Tree
lines, that court found that when a party who is in an inferior bargaining
position is compelled to assert her claims in arbitration, and is thereby
precluded from turning to less expensive public fora, and the costs of the
arbitral forum render her unable to pursue her
claim, the clause is oppressive
4
and one-sided, and thus unconscionable. 1
D. Lack of consideration
Recognizing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the need to invalidate
arbitration agreements only for reasons that would apply generally to contracts,
a number of courts have examined the consideration supporting the arbitration
agreement before them and have found it to be wanting. Several decisions
involving the restaurant chain Ryan's Steak House have rejected its arbitration5
system on this ground, including Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses Inc.11
and Floss v. Ryan 's Family Steakhouses Inc. 6 In Penn,the court found that a
contract between the employee and the arbitration service (not the employer,
Ryan's), which the employee signed as a condition of his employment, was not

110

91 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1104-05.
See Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F.Supp.2d 937 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
Id. at 940.

III

Id.

112

Id. at 940-41.

13

991 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
Id. at 1437.

106
107

108
109

114
115
116

269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
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agreement provided that the employee
enforceable under Indiana law.1
had to use the service to arbitrate any employment-related disputes with
Ryan's, and the service promised only to provide an arbitration forum, rules,
procedures, a hearing, and a decision."" These were at best illusory and
unenforceable promises on the part of the service, as there was nothing to
limit its ability to amend the rules.' 19 Furthermore, the court concluded that
Indiana would not treat any promise made by the employer to Penn as
substitute consideration. Floss found similar problems with the arrangement;
it too was concerned about the service's unfettered discretion to change the
rules and procedures at any time without any notice or consent from the
employees. 120 Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc.121 presented a
problem of prior consideration. There, the court found that under Indiana law
an employee's promise to submit discrimination claims to arbitration was not
supported by consideration in the form of the employer's promise to hire her
or to continue to employ her, where she was already hired at the time she
made the promise, and the employer never made any commitment that she
could continue to work there. 12The much earlier decision in Hull v, Norcom,
Inc. 123 also insisted on real mutuality of promises. There, the Court said that
the mere presence of an arbitration clause is insufficient to enforce the
arbitration agreement; the consideration exchanged for one party's promise to
arbitrate must be the other party's promise to arbitrate at least some specified
class of claims.1 24 Dumais v. American GolfCorp. was another case in which
the employee signed an agreement to arbitrate after he was already hired. 125 In
addition, this was another agreement in which the employee was bound, but
the employer was free 26unilaterally to modify the terms of the arbitration
agreement at any time. 1
E. Flaws related to notice
The last set of cases involve concerns about the quality of the notice the
employee received. In addition to the language problem noted in Prevot,there
have been other cases in which arbitration clauses have not been enforced
because of faulty notice. In Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 127 the Ninth Circuit
held that an employee did not, by signing an acknowledgment in an employee
117
118
19

Id. at 761.

Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 757.

123

See Floss, 211 F.3d at 315-16.
121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1131.
750 F.2d 1547 (1 th Cir. 1985).

124

Id. at 1550.

125

150 F.Supp. 2d 1182 (D.N.M. 2001).
Id. at 1193.
152 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998).

120
121
122

126

127
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handbook, knowingly agree to arbitrate his employment discrimination claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Arizona Civil Rights
Act. 128 The acknowledgment did not mention or imply that the handbook
contained an arbitration provision. 129 (Furthermore, in many handbook cases,
employees attempt to persuade courts that they have a contractual right to
continued employment, while employers point to handbook language
announcing that the handbook does not create any enforceable legal rights.
There is little chance that a court would permit an employer to have things
both ways: either the handbook does create a contract, including a contract to
submit claims to arbitration, or it does not.) In Renteria v. Prudential
InsuranceCo. ofAmercia, 130 the court refused to find a knowing waiver of the
right to litigate Title VII claims where neither the arbitration clause nor any
other written employment agreement expressly put the employees on notice
that they were bound to arbitrate Title VII claims. Finally, in Alphagraphics
Franchising,Inc. v. Whaler Graphics,Inc.,131 the district court concluded that
a forum selection clause applicable to an arbitration provision in a franchise
agreement was not enforceable because of fraud in the inducement. 3 2 The
franchisors had provided notice to franchisees in their offering circular that
franchise agreements requiring arbitration to take place outside of Michigan
were unenforceable under Michigan law, but they had conveniently failed to
disclose that they planned
to rely on the FAA in order to enforce the clause
33
despite the state law.
V.

CONCLUSION

No one should question the utility of arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution in a wide variety of contexts. In the international arena, it provides
a vital and trusted way that business partners from different countries can
arrange for the resolution of disputes that may arise in their commercial or
other business transactions. It can do the same thing in purely domestic
commercial relationships, where it is sometimes of great value to be able to
choose a decisionmaker who is expert in the field, to take advantage of more
flexible procedures, and to try to resolve disputes quickly and more or less
harmoniously, so that the business can continue. Arbitration has served
exactly that function for decades in the area of employer-union relations,
where the promise of speedy industrial arbitration has served as a beneficial
alternative to cruder tools like strikes and lock-outs.

128
129

130

131
132
133

Id. at 1155.
Id.
113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
840 F. Supp. 708 (D. AZ. 1993).
Id. at 711.
Id.
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The problems we are encountering today have come as arbitration has
expanded to two new areas: consumer transactions, and statutory claims. The
issues that each of these new areas raise are distinct, but they point in the
same direction. If arbitration is to play a significant role in the enforcement of
public law, then arbitration itself must become more publicly accountable.
Accountability may not require any modifications in the general standards
used to enforce agreements to arbitrate at the front end, but it may require a
careful expansion of the grounds on which ultimate awards can be reviewed
in the courts. With respect to consumer transactions, the formation of the
agreement to arbitrate and the costs of the arbitral procedure are both matters
of concern. Contracts of adhesion do not look much like the model of
agreement that traditionally underlay arbitration. Perhaps a system requiring
affirmative opt-in procedures, rather than the negative option most consumers
typically receive now (i.e. if you continue to use your telephone, you have
agreed to arbitrate), might be better. On the costs front, some consumer
arbitration agreements permit the consumer to use the local small claims court
if the claim falls within that court's jurisdiction. That is an interesting idea,
and one that deserves further study. Otherwise, the rules relating to costs must
steer between the Scylla of employer/franchisor/company bias (where the
more powerful party pays for everything and has a long-term relationship
with the arbitration provider) and the Charybdis of pricing the less powerful
party out of any dispute resolution forum at all (where costs are shared
evenly). The use of established organizations like the AAA is one way to
ensure neutrality, especially when the rules of procedure are tailored to the
kind of case that is submitted.
Arbitration has a promising future, but if it is to serve all the functions
that are now being demanded of it, it will need to adapt. Just as the courts
themselves adapted over time, and developed special rules for family
relations, special rules for small claims, and special rules distinguishing
between civil and criminal proceedings, the process of arbitration will have to
adapt as well. As that process unfolds, either the Congress or the Supreme
Court may wish to consider whether it would be better to return to the fifty
laboratories of legal development that the states can be, or if it is preferable to
keep every kind of arbitration federalized for all purposes. Either way,
experimentation will have to be the word of the day. Arbitration is here with
us to stay, and it has now become our duty to make it as fair, as cost-effective,
as true to the law, and as accountable as possible.
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